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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

high to help pay for his fixed cost of production, such as machinery, equipment, buildings, interest on investment, etc. Any such bill, to cut production in Federal order markets, would have to incorporate an excess price, far below the level of price of the lowest class use.

Sixth, Page 2, lines 4 and 7, includes within the base "reserves of milk as may be found essential thereto." Many markets are on a 3- or 4-day bottling schedule. This means that as the bottling week shortens the necessary reserves in the market could be interpreted to mean as high as 50 percent above fluid milk requirements. With the technological advancements in transportation the interpretation of necessary reserves should include supplies available from alternative sources. The bill as written would not only protect the producers within each Federal order from outside competition, but would allow for protected increases in production far above the level of production presently in most orders.

Seventh, Page 2, line 11, states that bases are transferable. This particular provision would result in values being attached to bases with their subsequent sale to the highest bidder, or producers under orders which can do the best job of gaging the highest class I prices from their consumers.

In summary the bill entitled "S. 1918" would reverse the Supreme Court decision, disadvantage the consumer and in the long run the dairy producer, including those producers the bill was designed to help.

Your thoughtful consideration and opposition to this bill would be greatly appreciated.

Very sincerely yours,
WISCONSIN DAIRIES CO-OPERATIVE,
ROBERT J. WILLIAMS,
Public Relations and Procurement
Director.

P.S.—This letter is in behalf of Wisconsin Dairies Cooperative which is the second largest in Wisconsin and Dairy Maid Products, Eau Claire, which is a federation of cooperatives with a total farmer membership of 31,000.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore: Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of Executive M (88th Cong., 1st sess.), the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senate is in executive session. The treaty is in the Committee of the Whole and is open to amendment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President—The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arkansas yield, without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I consider it a high honor to have the privilege of presenting to the Senate, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

This treaty, if it receives the approval of this body, may well prove to be a turning point in history of incalculable significance to the human race—and especially to all Americans, who, because of our strength, bear a special responsibility for the prevention of a nuclear war.

In a few words, this treaty makes sense under the conditions confronting the world today.

I shall try to develop, in my remarks, the reasons why it makes sense; but I urge Senators to give serious consideration to all aspects of this treaty and to develop, as fully as possible, every facet of the questions involved.

This treaty, I am confident, will stand up under the closest scrutiny. It was because of my conviction about the merits of the agreement, that I invited the members of the Armed Services Committee and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to sit with the Committee on Foreign Relations during the taking of testimony and to have a full opportunity to examine each and every witness on the same terms as those available to the members of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

I was pleased by the cooperation of the members of the committees. Their questions did much to develop many of the more esoteric and difficult aspects of the scientific and technical problems involved.

In short, I believe an exhaustive and complete examination of all relevant questions is contained in the 1,000 pages of public testimony, together with the many hundreds of pages of executive hearings.

In deciding whether to render its advice and consent to the nuclear test ban treaty, Mr. President, the Senate must consider two basic questions: first, is the treaty compatible with the military security of the United States? Second, does it advance the broad purposes of American foreign policy? On the basis of extensive committee hearings, I believe the answers to both of these questions are affirmative, and that the treaty is indeed, both safe and wise.

In my remarks I should like to comment briefly on the military and technical factors in the treaty, and then to discuss some of its broad political implications. Military and technical considerations were examined in detail in the combined meetings of the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Atomic Energy, and are further elaborated in the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations. These factors have to do with the safety and prudence of our adherence to the treaty. Less attention has been given to the reason and purpose of the treaty, which have to do with its long-term implications for international relations.

At the outset, I should like to commend my colleagues on the three committees which heard testimony on the treaty for the responsible and bipartisan spirit of the proceedings. The hearings before the three committees and the subsequent deliberations of the Committee on Foreign Relations were characterized throughout by an awareness that this treaty, which in its broad outlines and intent were conceived by a Republican administration, and is now being implemented by a Democratic administration, is a matter of the national interest, transcending all considerations of personal and partisan advantage. It is particularly noteworthy and commendable that in the Foreign Relations Committee the motion to report the treaty favorably and without reservation was offered by the senior Republican on the Senate, the Senator from Vermont [Mr. Aiken], and received the unanimous support of the Republican members of the committee.

Before examining the wisdom of our adherence to this treaty and the ways in which it can be expected to advance our overall national interests, we must assure ourselves that the proposed commitment is a safe one, one which will not derogate from the military superiority and strategic advantages which the United States now possesses.

It is the strongly held conviction of the officials who have the main responsibility for our national defense, both civilian and military, that the American nuclear force is, and under the treaty will remain, manifestly superior to that of any other nation. As the Secretary of Defense pointed out in his statement in support of the treaty, the U.S. nuclear force now contains, in addition to tactical, airborne, and other nuclear weapons, more than 500 missiles—Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, and Polaris—and it is planned to increase this number to over 1,700 by 1966. In addition, the United States has nuclear armed SAC bombers on air alert and over 500 SAC bombers on quick-reaction alert. By contrast, Secretary McNamara pointed out, the consensus is that the Soviets could place less than half as many bombers over North America on a first strike. It is estimated that the Soviets have only a fraction of the number of ICBM missiles that we have and that their submarines launched ballistic missiles are short range, require launching from the surface, and are generally not comparable with our own Polaris force. According to the best available estimates, our numerical superiority in ballistic missiles will increase both absolutely and relatively between now and 1966. In short, our nuclear superiority is both great and growing.

As to the effects of the treaty on this favorable military balance, the key fact is that whatever opportunities for progress in nuclear technology are opened or closed to the United States, the same opportunities will be opened or closed to the Soviet Union. In the judgment of the Secretary of Defense and most of his military and scientific advisers, the most probable ultimate result of unrestricted nuclear testing would be tech-

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